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Abstract
We consider a two period model where consumers have different switching
costs. Before the market opens an incumbent sells to all consumers; after the
market opens competitors appear. We identify the equilibrium both with
Stackelberg and Bertrand competition and show how the presence of low
switching cost consumers benefits the incumbent, despite the fact that it
never sells to any of them. Furthermore, we identify a free rider effect among
consumers.
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1 Introduction
A firm which, in the past, has acquired a clientele composed of consumers
with low switching costs will be forced, in the presence of entry, to charge low
prices for fear of losing its consumers. By contrast, a firm which in the past
has acquired a clientele composed of high switching cost consumers will be
able to charge a high price. Foreseeing this, high switching costs consumers
will have incentives to “follow” low switching costs consumers — i.e., to
purchase from the same firms as they do. This implies that heterogeneity
of switching costs has complex strategic consequences which have largely
been ignored in the literature. It will influence the strategies of firms, the
equilibrium distribution of clients, and the value of incumbency. In this paper
we explore these links.
In order to do so, we build a simple two period model. There is a contin-
uum of consumers who need to buy one unit of a good in each of two periods.
Changing supplier induces a switching cost and consumers try to minimize
the total discounted sum of the prices which they pay and the switching costs
that they incur. Consumers have heterogenous switching costs. There are
also two types of firms: at the beginning of period 1, there is an Incumbent
firm which has sold to all consumers in the past and both in periods 1 and 2
there are at least two potential entrants.
If consumers all had the same switching costs, they could make their pur-
chasing decisions without taking into account the choices of other consumers.
We showed in Biglaiser, Cre´mer, and Dobos (2013) (see also section 3) that
in this case the discounted profit of the incumbent over any finite number of
periods is equal to its profit in a one period model: in any period the entrants
compete away any future rent.
On the other hand, when switching costs differ, a firm’s price depends on
the types of its past customers. Therefore, when making their purchasing
decisions rational consumers take into account not only the price that firms
charge, but also the types of their other clients. This makes the strategies of
the consumers interdependent; as we will see, for a large range of parameters,
some high switching cost consumers, expecting a lower price in period 2,
choose in period 1 to purchase from an entrant who has attracted a sufficient
number of low switching cost consumers despite the fact that by doing so
they incur a higher current total cost. The high switching cost consumers
will free ride on the presence of the low switching cost consumers.
This interdependence has a significant effect on the pricing decisions and
on the profits of the firms as well as on the equilibrium market shares. We
show this, first, in a model where consumers are of two different types: they
either have a low switching cost, σL or a high switching costs, σH . If σL/σH
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is small enough the incumbent firm will price so that it will always lose
some of the high switch cost consumers in equilibrium. Furthermore, while
the incumbent does not sell to any low switching cost consumer their pres-
ence affects its profits which increase as their number increases and as their
switching cost decrease. We are even able to identify circumstances where,
for intermediate values of σL/σH , the profits of the incumbent are smaller in
the two period model than in the one period model (see Corollary 4). Finally,
we demonstrate that for a large class of parameters the negative consequence
for the incumbent of a decrease in the switching costs of high switching cost
consumers can be overwhelmed by an equal decrease in the switching cost of
the low type consumers.
We also find that the free rider effect is present in the second case, when
there is a continuum of consumer switching costs. In this setting, a period 1
entrant attracts the lowest type consumers up to some cutoff switching cost.
It then prices in period 2 so as to lose its period 1 consumers with the
smallest switching costs. Nearly all its period 2 consumers pay a price smaller
than their switching costs and profit from the presence of consumers with
lower switching costs. We show that the profits of the Incumbent in the two
period model are larger than in the one period model, and smaller than the
discounted value of one period profit.
In a companion paper, Biglaiser et al. (2013), we studied an infinite hori-
zon model where some consumers have (the same) positive switching cost and
others have zero switching cost. Although these hypotheses lead to clean re-
sults, the main externality which we identify in the current paper is not
present. We discuss this more precisely in section 6, where we also present a
detailed discussion of the links between this paper and the literature.
We present the model in section 2. Then, as a benchmark, in section 3, we
briefly discuss the equilibrium when all consumers have the same switching
cost. In section 4 we characterize the equilibrium when there are two types of
consumers, before turning to the case with a continuum of types in section 5.
We discuss the literature in section 6 and present some concluding remarks
in section 7.
2 The model
We consider a two period model, with initially one Incumbent, and free entry
in every period. The firms produce identical goods at zero cost.1 There is a
1In order to attract consumers, firms will charge negative prices. Our model yields
exactly the same results with strictly positive marginal cost: the negative price must
simply be interpreted as a discount below marginal cost. In markets where negative prices
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continuum of consumers with mass normalized to 1. They have a perfectly
inelastic demand for one unit of the good, and therefore buy one unit in each
period — their aim is to minimize the cost of acquiring these units. In this
section and in section 4, there are two types of consumers: high switching
cost (hsc) consumers, who represent a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the population,
have a switching cost equal to σH , while low switching cost (lsc) consumers,
who form a fraction 1 − α of the population, have a switching cost equal
to σL, with 0 < σL < σH . The switching cost is incurred every time a
consumer changes from one supplier to another. It reflects industry wide
similarities or compatibilities between products, rather than idiosyncrasies
of specific sellers.
In period 0, and, maybe, in previous periods, the consumers have bought
from the Incumbent, firm I. We take I’s position as given and do not examine
how it became the incumbent, but only the continuation game once other
firms can enter. Thus, we do not analyze whether some of the incumbency
rents that we identify were exhausted in the competition to become the
Incumbent (see Klemperer (1987)).
For simplicity, in the main text we assume that there is free entry, i.e.,
that there is a large number2 of potential entrants which can enter the market
at zero cost, in periods 1 and in period 2 — it is easy to see that the proofs
hold with minor changes if there are only two potential entrants in each
period.3 In period 2 the incumbent(s) are all the firms that sold to a strictly
positive mass of consumers in each period. These incumbents include the
Incumbent, if it “keeps” some of its consumers, and the successful or active
period 1 entrants, that is those who attracted consumers. The main focus of
our study is the following “Bertrand” game:
Stage 1: The incumbent(s) and the entrants set prices;
Stage 2: The consumers choose from which firm to buy.
All of our qualitative results also hold true, and are sometimes easier to
establish, in the “Stackelberg” version of this game:
are impossible, for instance because of free disposal, we would need to assume that the
marginal cost is large enough compared to the switching cost (alternately, firms could add
free features, such as video content, which would play the same role as negative prices).
2Technically, a denumerable set. This is equivalent to a zero profit condition for
entrants.
3As we will prove, consumers always buy from one of the lowest price entrants. There-
fore Bertrand competition among the entrants forces them to use strategies which yield
zero expected profits: in any equilibrium in which this would not be the case, at least one
of the entrants would have incentives to undercut the other(s). The free entry assumption
simplifies the exposition by making the discussion of this undercutting unnecessary.
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Stage 1: The incumbent(s) sets price(s);
Stage 2: The entrants set their prices;
Stage 3: The consumers choose from which firm to buy.
The discount factor, common to all the firms and all the consumers, is
δ ∈ (0, 1].
Note that, following much of the literature, we assume that only short
term contracts are used and that consumers’ switching costs do not depend
on the firm from which they purchase.
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, assuming that the equilib-
rium strategy of each firm depends only on the number (measure) of con-
sumers of each type which purchased its product in the previous period. This
constraint on the strategies only binds in the second period, and implies that
a consumer can change supplier in the first period without affecting second
period prices.
3 All consumers have the same switching cost
Before turning to the analysis of the model in section 2, it is worthwhile to
sketch the analysis of the case where all consumers have the same switching
cost: σH = σL
def
= σ (see Biglaiser et al. (2013) for a more detailed descrip-
tion).
If there is only one period, at equilibrium the Incumbent would clearly
charge σ and “keep” all the consumers. Because there is a mass 1 of con-
sumers, its profit would also be equal to σ.
Turning to the two period model, in equilibrium, whether in the Bertrand
or Stackelberg models, all second period incumbents (that is all firms that
have sold a positive amount of the good in the first period) charge σ, and
make profits equal to σ times the mass of their first period customers. There-
fore, the lower bound of the prices that entrants can charge in the first period
without making negative profits is −δσ. Consumers know that all incum-
bents will charge σ in the second period. Hence, firm I will be able to “keep”
its customers only by charging a price less than or equal to −δσ + σ. It is
straightforward to show that it indeed charges this price and “keeps” all
its customers, under both Bertrand or Stackelberg competition. Hence its
discounted profit is −δσ + σ + δσ = σ. The profits are the same in the
intertemporal model as in the static model: a firm gets only one bite of the
switching costs! This logic holds for all finite of periods and for an infinite
horizon, subject to stationarity conditions (see Biglaiser and Cre´mer (2011)).
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4 High and low switching costs: analysis
Except in subsection 4.5, we assume that σL is small enough that the condi-
tion
σL <
αδ
1 + δ
σH , (1)
holds. This implies
σL < ασH . (2)
In a one period model, entrants will always charge a price of 0. Thus, (2)
implies that the Incumbent would charge σH , sell to all the hsc consumers
and to no lsc consumer, and make a profit equal to ασH instead of selling
to all consumers at a price of σL for a profit of σL. (In subsection 4.5, we
study environments where inequality (1) does not hold.)
Turning to the two period model, we present the profits of the Incumbent
and some comparative statics in Proposition 1 and in Corollary 1. After some
comments and interpretation, we prove Proposition 1 for the Stackelberg
model in 4.1 and for the Bertrand model in 4.2. It turns out that, despite
the fact that profits are the same in both models, consumer surplus and
welfare differ; we discuss these differences in 4.4.
Proposition 1. If condition (1) is satisfied, the equilibrium profit of the
Incumbent is
Π = σH
[
ασH − σL
σH − σL (1 + δ − αδ)
]
(3)
under either Stackelberg or Bertrand competition. Π is greater than the one
period profit, ασH , and smaller than the discounted value of a flow of one
period profit, ασH(1 + δ).
The presence of lsc buyers enables the Incumbent to generate higher
profits than it would receive in the one period model, ασH . Furthermore, as
α converges to 1, Π converges to σH , the one period profit. This is also the
case if σL converges to αδσH/(1 + δ), the right hand side of (1).
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Proposition 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 1:
1. The profit Π of the Incumbent is increasing in α and σH and decreasing
in σL;
2. If α < (σL + σH)/2σH , which is always satisfied if α < 1/2, then an
equal increase in σH and σL leads to a decrease in Π (∂Π/∂σL+∂Π/∂σH <0).
4As detailed in Corollary 4, with σL > αδσH/(1+δ) the profit in the one period model
is greater than the profit in the two period model.
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3. If σL < α
2δσH/(1 + δ), then a small increase in the number of lsc
consumers increases the profits of the Incumbent. For small enough η, if σH
is increased by η and σL reduced by η(1 − α)/α, so that the market average
switching cost stays constant, then Π increases.
Without surprise, when α or σH increase, the profit of the Incumbent
increases. To understand why an increase in σL decreases profits, we take as
granted what we will show below: the Incumbent will always price in such
a way that it sells to no lsc consumer. Let us assume, only for expository
purposes, that only one entrant attracted customers in the first period —
it has attracted all the lsc consumers and a proportion γ′ > 0 of the hsc
customers. Therefore, its second period profit is αγ ′σH if it charges σH , and
(αγ ′ + (1 − α))σL if it charges σL. It is indifferent between charging σL
and σH if γ
′ = γ, where γ is defined by
αγσH = (αγ + (1− α))σL
⇐⇒ γ = 1− α
α
σL
σH − σL =
1− α
α
(
σH
σH − σL − 1
)
. (4)
From (4), it is straightforward that an increase in σL leads to an increase
in γ: the benefits for the entrant of ‘keeping’ the lsc customers in the second
period increases, thus the number of hsc consumers attracted in the first
period must increase if the entrant is to be kept indifferent between its two
plausible second period strategies.5 In equilibrium, in the first period a
proportion γ of hsc consumers purchase from the entrant: if fewer than this
proportion did so, the entrant would charge a low price in the second period,
and be very attractive to hsc customers.6 Therefore when σL increases, the
Incumbent loses more customers, which explains the result.
Whether an equal increase in both σH and σL will increase or decrease the
profit of the Incumbent will therefore depend on the relative strengths of two
opposing effects, which, by (3), can be determined by evaluating the change
in σH(ασH − σL). Adding η to both σH and σL and taking the derivative
for η = 0, we obtain result ii) in Corollary 1: the negative consequences for
the Incumbent of an increase in σL swamps the positive consequences of an
equal increase in σH when α is small enough.
7 (As explained in section 6,
5In our companion paper with σL = 0, there is no positive γ that makes an entrant
indifferent between pricing to keep only the hsc and pricing to keep all the consumers: in
the latter case its profit is 0!
6As we will see shortly, the entrant mixes between σH and σL in the second period.
7It is easy to prove by computing the value of the derivative of
(1+ η)σH
[ α
1+η σH − σL
σH − σL (1 + δ −
α
1 + η
δ)
]
=
σH
σH − σL (ασH − (1+ η)σL)(1+ δ−
α
1 + η
δ).
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we obtain these “counterintuitive” comparative statics for reasons different
than the rest of the literature.)
Note that part 3 of the corollary requires a σL smaller than the upper
bound authorized by equation (1). Indeed, when σL is small entrants do not
want to attract lsc customers, and an increase in their number makes the
entrants less aggressive. On the other hand, when σL is larger, lsc customers
become valuable enough to entrants that an increase in their number makes
the entrants more aggressive.
Much empirical research is focussed on changes of the average switching
cost, but this is not the relevant statistic to evaluate the consequences of
switching costs on market outcomes. Indeed, routine calculations demon-
strate that if σH is increased by η and σL is reduced by ηα/(1− α), so as to
maintain the average switching cost but increase the variance of the switching
costs, then the Incumbent’s profit is increased. An increase in the variance
of the switching cost increases the profits of the Incumbent.
We now turn to the proof of the Proposition 1.
4.1 Proof of Proposition 1 for the Stackelberg model
In period 2 of the Stackelberg model, all the firms which sold strictly positive
amounts in period 1 (the “period 2 incumbents”) announce their prices first,
followed by the entrants. Because period 2 entrants charge 0, the following
lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 1. In period 2, incumbents charge
(i) σH if the proportion of hsc consumers in their first period clientele
is strictly greater than σL/σH ;
(ii) σL if this proportion is strictly smaller than σL/σH ;
(iii) σH or σL, maybe mixing between the two, if it is equal to σL/σH .
If the firm from which it purchased in period 1 charges σH in period 2, a
lsc consumer will choose to purchase from a period 2 entrant at a price of 0.
Hence, his total (price + switching cost) period 2 cost will always be equal
to σL, no matter which firm he purchased from in period 1. This proves
the following lemma where we call pI the price charged by the Incumbent in
period 1 and pE the lowest price charged by any entrant in that period.
Lemma 2. In the first period, lsc consumers purchase from one of the lowest
price entrants if pE + σL < pI and from the Incumbent if pE + σL > pI . If
pE + σL = pI they are indifferent between purchasing from one of the lowest
priced entrants and purchasing from the Incumbent.
with respect to η for η = 0.
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Lemma 2 shows that lsc customers minimize their cost in each period.
Because it is strictly more expensive for hsc than for lsc consumers to
switch firms, no hsc consumer switches suppliers in the first period unless all
the lsc consumers switch. This implies that the proportion of hsc consumers
in the first period clientele of the Incumbent will be at least equal to α, and
therefore proves part (i) of Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. In period 2, the first period Incumbent charges σH .
Clearly, any entrant who attracted consumers in period 1, will set prices
in period 2 according to Lemma 1. We leave the easy proof of the following
lemma to the reader.
Lemma 4. If some hsc consumers purchase from an entrant in the first
period, they purchase from one of the lowest price entrants and so do all
the lsc consumers. Furthermore, in the second period successful first period
entrants either all charge σL, all charge σH or all mix between σL and σH
with the same probabilities.
Going back to period 1, these three lemmas enable us to prove the fol-
lowing lemma, which describes the continuation payoff of the Incumbent as
a function of the price it charges in the first period (see the appendix).
Lemma 5. For a given price, pI , charged by the Incumbent in the first period:
(i) if pI < (1 − δ)σL, the Incumbent sells to all consumers in period 1
and to all hsc consumers (at price σH) in period 2. Its profit is pI + δασH .
(ii) if (1 − δ)σL < pI < (1 − δ)σH , the Incumbent sells to all hsc con-
sumers in both periods and to no lsc consumer in either period. Its profit is
α(pI + δσH).
(iii) if (1 − δ)σH < pI < (1 − αδ)σH , there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
the Incumbent sells to α(1− γ) hsc consumers at price pI in period 1 and at
price σH in period 2, while its sales to lsc consumers are equal to 0 in both
periods. Its profit is α(1− γ)(pI + δσH).
(iv) if (1− αδ)σH < pI , the Incumbent has zero sales in both periods.
From Lemma 5, the profits of the Incumbent are increasing on the inter-
vals (−∞, (1 − δ)σL), ((1 − δ)σL, (1 − δ)σH) and
(
(1 − δ)σH , (1 − αδ)σH
)
.
Given the restrictions that we have imposed on σL/σH , it is easy to check
that it is maximized on the union of these intervals for pI smaller than and
‘very close to’ (1 − αδ)σH . Therefore, the only equilibrium of the game
has the Incumbent charging (1 − αδ)σH in the first period with the contin-
uation equilibrium described in point iii, yielding the profits described by
equation (3). For the hsc consumers to be indifferent between purchasing
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from the Incumbent and an entrant in period 1, it must be the case that
any entrant who attracts consumers in period 1 charges σH in period 2 with
probability
q
def
=
ασH − σL
σH − σL . (5)
This proves Proposition 1 for the Stackelberg model.
4.2 The proof of Proposition 1 in the Bertrand model
In this subsection, we prove that in any Bertrand equilibrium equation (3),
and therefore Proposition 1, hold. In subsection 4.3 we prove that there
exists a Bertrand equilibrium.
Notice first that Lemmas 1 to 4 of section 4.1 also hold in the case of
Bertrand equilibria — the proofs are exactly the same. Because of free entry,
period 2 entrants choose a price equal to 0. By Lemma 3, as in the Stackelberg
case, a period 2 incumbent charges σL or σH depending on whether the
proportion of its hsc customers in period 1 was less or greater than σL/σH ,
and, clearly, the Incumbent charges σH in period 2. Furthermore, this implies
that, as in the Stackelberg case, in period 1 lsc consumers will optimally
behave as if they were myopic, switching to one of the lowest price entrants if
the difference between its price and the Incumbent’s price is greater than σL
and not switching if this difference is smaller than σL. It also implies that
any hsc consumer who does not buy from the Incumbent in period 1 also
buys from one of the lowest priced entrants. Indeed, any other entrant would
attract only hsc customers, and therefore charge σH in period 2.
We are now ready to study the pricing behavior of the firms in period 1.
Claims 1 to 6 hold for any set of parameters and are not restricted to the
case when σL < αδσH/(1 + δ). We begin by Claim 1 which describes the
behavior of entrants.
Claim 1. In period 1, any active entrant charges a price in [−δασH ,−δσL].
Proof. Any entrant who has attracted consumers in period 1 will charge at
least σL in period 2. Therefore, competition and free entry will ensure that
in period 1 no entrant which charges more than −δσL attracts a positive
measure of customers with positive probability. If the lower priced entrants
charge prices strictly smaller than −δασH and attract consumers their ag-
gregate profit is negative: they attract all the lsc consumers; therefore the
proportion of hsc consumers in their clientele is at most α and their aggre-
gate second period profit at most ασH .
The next two claims describe properties of the Incumbent’s first period
demand function.
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Claim 2. If the Incumbent charges a price strictly greater than σH(1− δ) in
period 1, then it sells to at most (1− γ)α hsc customers.
Proof. Assume pI > (1 − δ)σH . Because −δσL + σL < (1 − δ)σH , Claim 1
implies that all the lsc consumers, who optimally act myopically in the first
period, purchase from entrants. If in the aggregate the entrants attract a
proportion of hsc customers smaller than γ, at least one of them will have
a proportion of period 1 hsc customers strictly smaller than σL/σH and
therefore charge σL with probability 1 in period 2. Hsc customers would find
this entrant more attractive than the Incumbent as (−δσL + σH) + δσL <
σH(1− δ) + δσH , which establishes the contradiction.
Claim 3. If in period 1 the Incumbent charges a price strictly smaller than
σH(1− αδ), then it sells to at least (1− γ)α hsc customers.
Proof. If the Incumbent sold to fewer that (1 − γ)α consumers, at least one
of the successful entrants would attract enough hsc customers in the first
period to charge σH in the second period; by Claim 1, these hsc customers
would incur total discounted costs equal to at least −δασH +σH +δσH , which
is strictly larger than the total discounted costs that they would incur from
buying from the Incumbent in both periods.
Claims 2 and 3 show that for pI ∈ (σH(1−δ), σH(1−αδ)), the Incumbent
sells to exactly (1 − γ)α customers. This implies the following claim.
Claim 4. The Incumbent will never choose a first period price in (σH(1 −
δ), σH(1− αδ)).
Furthermore, this allows us to put a lower bound on the profit of the
Incumbent.
Claim 5. By choosing pI below but ‘close to’ σH(1−αδ), the Incumbent can
guarantee itself discounted profits arbitrarily close to (1−γ)ασH(1−αδ + δ).
Proof. It sells to at least (1 − γ)α hsc consumers at price (1 − αδ)σH in
period 1 and at price σH in period 2.
Letting bI denote the lower bound on the Incumbent’s price, we find
Claim 6. bI ≤ σH(1− αδ).
Proof. The Incumbent makes strictly positive profits. This implies that pE
is not strictly smaller than pI − σH with probability 1. However, if bI >
σH(1− αδ) an entrant could charge a price in (−αδσH , bI + σH) and obtain
strictly positive expected profits. In the states of nature where it is not the
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lowest priced entrant, it would attract no consumers and make a profit equal
to 0. When it is the lowest price entrant, which would happen with strictly
positive probability by Claim 1, it would undercut the other entrants and
also undercut the Incumbent by more than σH ; its discounted profit would
be strictly positive, which establishes the contradiction.
Up to now, the only restriction on σL/σH which we have used is that it is
smaller than α. We now restrict the analysis to the cases where condition (1)
(σL < αδσH/(1+ δ)) holds. This enables us to prove the following claim and
by implication Proposition 1.
Claim 7. If condition (1) holds, then at equilibrium bI > σH(1− δ).
Proof. The Incumbent never sells to any lsc consumers. Indeed, to do so
it would have to choose a price smaller than or equal to (1 − δ)σL and its
profit would be smaller than or equal to (1 − δ)σL + δασH . When (1) holds
this profit is less than the profit which it can guarantee by selling to (1 −γ)α
consumers (see Claim 5). Indeed, because
1− γ = 1
α
(
1− (1− α)σH
σH − σL
)
we have
(1− δ)σL + δασH − [(1− γ)ασH(1− αδ + δ)]
= (1− δ)σL + δασH − σH(1− αδ + δ)
(
1− (1− α)σH
σH − σL
)
(6)
< σH
[
(1− δ)αδ
1 + δ
+ δα− (1− αδ + δ)
(
1− 1− α
1− αδ
1+δ
)]
(7)
= σH
[
(1− δ)αδ
1 + δ
+ δα− (1− αδ + δ) α
1 + δ − αδ
]
=
ασH
1 + δ
(−1 + δ) < 0,
where the inequality in (7) stems from (1) and from the fact that the right
hand side of (6) is decreasing in σL
By Claim 2, if the Incumbent chooses pI > σH(1 − δ), at least αγ
hsc consumers buy from a period 1 entrant. Thus, the highest profit the
Incumbent could make while selling to all hsc consumers in period 1 is
σH(1 − δ) + δσH = ασH . Using Claim 5, the Incumbent can improve its
profit by charging a price larger than σH(1− δ), since equation (1) is equiv-
alent to ασH < (1− γ)ασH(1− αδ + δ).
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Claims 4, 6 and 7 imply bI = σH(1−αδ) whenever (1) holds. By Claim 2
this implies that the discounted profit of the Incumbent is bounded above by
(1− γ)ασH(1− αδ + δσH) = (1− γ)α(bI + δσH).
By Claim 5, this quantity is also a lower bound on the profit, and this proves
Proposition 1.
4.3 What do Bertrand equilibria look like?
The reasoning of 4.2 is sufficient to prove equation (3), but a) leaves open the
question of existence of equilibrium and b) does not provide much intuition
about the equilibrium strategies of the agents. In this subsection, we tackle
both of these issues by describing explicitly one equilibrium of the Bertrand
game.
In all equilibria the Incumbent and the entrants use mixed strategies
in period 1. For simplicity, we present an equilibrium where there is only
one8 active entrant, who chooses its price pE in [−αδσH ,−δσL], while the
Incumbent chooses pI in [σH(1− αδ),−δσL + σH) and at least one other
entrant charges −δσL with probability 1. Then, all lsc customers buy from
the active entrant, and, depending on the difference between pI and pE, either
all or a fraction γ of hsc customers purchase from the entrant:
Ù if pI − pE ≥ σH , then all hsc consumers buy from the entrant, who
therefore charges σH in the second period — its second period profit
is ασH ;
Ù if pI − pE < σH , a proportion γ purchases from the entrant, who in
the second period uses a mixed strategy: he chooses prices σL and σH
with probabilities such that the hsc customers are indifferent between
switching and not switching suppliers in period 1 — its second period
profit is (αγ + (1 − α))σL = αγσH (in the states of nature where its
second period price is σH , all the lsc customers switch to a period 2
entrant).
Therefore, in equilibrium, a proportion at least equal to γ of the hsc
consumers purchase from the entrant in period 1.
The entrant chooses pE according to the following distribution GE, which
8Our equilibrium is also an equilibrium if there are several active entrants and they
each choose a mixed strategy such that the distribution of the minimum of the prices
they charge is the function GE defined below. In other words, there are many different
payoff equivalent equilibria. The key to all equilibria is that there is free entry and that
all entrants make zero expected profits in equilibrium.
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has a mass point at −δσL:
GE(pE) =

pE + αδσH
pE + (1 + δ)σH
if pE∈ [−αδσH ,−δσL),
1 if pE= −δσL.
(8)
Then, for any pI ∈ [σH(1 − αδ), σH − δσL), the Incumbent’s expected dis-
counted profit is
GE(pI − σH)× 0 + (1−GE(pI − σH))× (1− γ)(pI + δσH)
= (1− γ)σH(1 + δ − αδ).
To understand why the Incumbent will not find it profitable to choose a
price outside of the interval [σH(1 − αδ), σH − δσL), we check for possible
deviations. It is not profitable for the Incumbent to choose pI ≥ σH − δσL,
as this implies pI − pE ≥ σH with probability 1, and no sales! To show that
it is not profitable to choose pI < σH(1− αδ), we proceed in two steps.
a) By charging σH(1 − αδ), the Incumbent sells to a proportion 1 − γ
of hsc customers. By Claim 2, to sell more, the Incumbent must choose
pI ≤ σH(1−δ), which implies that as long as it does not sell to lsc customers,
its profit, α(pI+δσH), is at most ασH and therefore smaller than (1−γ)σH(1+
δ − αδ) by (1).
b) In order to sell to lsc customers, the Incumbent needs to make their
total costs, over both periods, less than σL, which is the upper bound of
their cost if they switch to the entrant in the first period. Given that they
will switch in period 2 when it charges σH , this necessitates pI ≤ (1− δ)σL,
which leads to profits pI + δασH smaller than the profits when using the
equilibrium strategy.
In our equilibrium the Incumbent chooses pI according to the distribution
GI(pI) =
pI − σH(1− αδ)
pI − σH(1− αδ) + ((1− α) + αγ)(σH − pI − δσL) .
Then, the profit of the active entrant is
GI(pE + σH)× (pE + δσL)(1− α + αγ)
+ (1−GI(pE + σH))× (pE + δασH) = 0
when it chooses a price in [−αδσH ,−δσL], and smaller than or equal to 0
when it chooses a price outside of this interval (the presence of another
“inactive” entrant who charges −δσL is crucial for this last point).
In all equilibria, pI will be distributed according to GI and pE, interpreted
as the lower bound of the prices of the active entrants, will be distributed
13
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Figure 1: This figure represents the probability distributions in the mixed
strategies of the Incumbent and the entrant with σH = 1, σL = .2, α = .4
and δ = 1, which implies γ = 37.5%. For instance, reading along the vertical
dashed line, if pE = −0.35, we obtain G(pE) ≈ 0.03, which implies that if
the Incumbent chooses pI = 0.65 = −0.35 + σH , then it looses all its hsc
customers with probability 3% and sells to a proportion 1 − γ of them with
probability 97%. Similarly, if the entrant chooses pE = −0.35, it sells to a
proportion γ of hsc customers with a probability 31% and to all of them
with probability 69%.
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according to GE. We will let the interested reader convince himself of this
fact.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium strategies with σH = 1, σL = .2, α = .4
and δ = 1.
4.4 Comparing Stackelberg and Bertrand equilibria
We found a pure strategy equilibrium in the Stackelberg model, but only
mixed strategy equilibria in the Bertrand model. By Proposition 1, we saw
that the equilibrium profits were the same. On the other hand, consumer
utilities and welfare will differ across the two models. We first take up con-
sumer utilities:
Corollary 2. The expected utility of the hsc customers is lower in the
Bertrand equilibrium than in the Stackelberg equilibrium, while the expected
utility of the lsc customers is higher in the Bertrand than in the Stackelberg
equilibrium.
Proof. We first prove the results for the hsc consumers.
In period 1 of the Stackelberg equilibrium, some hsc consumers purchase
from the Incumbent at price pI = σH(1 − αδ). These consumers pay σH in
period 2, and their total discounted cost is −σH(1 + δ − αδ).
In the Bertrand equilibrium, there are only mixed strategy equilibria,
where the Incumbent’s first period price is strictly greater than σH(1− αδ),
which is the price it charges in the Stackelberg equilibrium. In the states
of nature when pI ≤ pE + σH , the Incumbent sells to some hsc consumers.
In period 2, these consumers will pay σH as in the Stackelberg equilibrium;
therefore, in these states of nature, the utility of hsc consumers is smaller in
the Bertrand model. In the states of nature where pI > pE +σH , none of the
hsc consumers purchase from the Incumbent. In period 2, they pay σH to the
entrant from which they purchased in period 1. Because this entrant charged
at least −αδσH in period 1, the total cost of the hsc consumers is at least
σH(1 + δ − αδ), which is also their utility in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Therefore, the hsc consumers are never better off and sometimes strictly
worse off in the Bertrand equilibrium.
Now, we prove the result for the lsc consumers. In both equilibria, the
period 2 cost of the lsc consumers is σL. In period 1 of both equilibria,
the lsc consumers purchase from one of the lowest priced entrants. In the
Stackelberg equilibrium, they pay −δσL with probability 1. In the Bertrand
equilibrium they never pay more than this amount, and pay strictly less with
strictly positive probability, which proves the result.
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Now, we turn to the difference in welfare between the two equilibria.
Since the firms offer identical products and all consumers make purchases
each period, the only difference in welfare is due to switching costs.
Corollary 3. Welfare is lower in the Bertrand than in the Stackelberg equi-
librium.
Proof. In the Stackelberg equilibrium all lsc customers switch in period 1
and a fraction γ of the hsc customers switch. In period 2, the lsc customers
switch with probability q — see (5). Thus, the aggregate welfare loss due to
switching is αγσH + (1− α)σL(1 + δq).
In the Bertrand equilibrium, when pI > pE +σH all the consumers switch
in period 1 and all the lsc customers switch in period 2, for an aggregate
welfare loss equal to ασH + (1 − α)σL(1 + δ), which is strictly greater than
the loss in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
When pI ≤ pE + σH a fraction γ of the hsc customers and all the lsc
customers switch in period 1, as in the Stackelberg equilibrium. In period 2,
none of the hsc customers switch, again as in the Stackelberg equilibrium,
and the lsc customers all switch with probability
1− σH + pE − pI
δ(σH − σL) .
Since this probability is strictly greater than q, the lsc customers switch
more in period 2 in the Bertrand equilibrium. Hence, there is always at least
as much switching in the Bertrand as in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Corollary 3 is a consequence of the fact that in the first period, in some
states of nature, all the hsc customers will purchase from an entrant in the
Bertrand equilibrium, which is not possible in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Furthermore, when all hsc consumers switch suppliers in period 1, the lsc
customers will switch in period 2 with probability 1, to avoid paying σH .
4.5 Equilibrium with large σL
For completeness of the two type switching cost model, we now turn to a
discussion of the equilibrium when equation (1) does not hold. Proofs and
more details can be found in the web appendix of this paper.
If σL is very large, i.e., σL ≥ ασH , then everything happens as if all the
consumers were lsc consumers: the Incumbent charges σL(1−δ) in period 1,
σL in period 2, and sells to all consumers in every period. Its total discounted
profit is σL the same profit as in the one period model with free entry and
the same profit as when all consumers are identical, see section 3.
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This leaves open the question of the cases when σL/σH ∈ (δα/(1+α), α).
If σL/σH ∈ (xC , α), where xC is the solution of (9) below, then there exists a
pure strategy equilibrium where in period 1 the Incumbent sells to all the hsc
consumers at a price σH(1−δ) and the entrants sell to all the lsc consumers
at a price −δσL. In period 2, the Incumbent charges σH and ‘keeps’ all
the hsc consumers — its profit over both periods is therefore ασH . The
best alternative strategy for the Incumbent would be to charge σH − δσL in
period 1, and sell to a proportion 1 − γ of the hsc consumers. This strategy
becomes more attractive as σL decreases, and dominates when σL/σH < xC ,
where xC ∈ (δα/(1 + α), α) is the solution of
xC (1 + δ + αδ − α) = δ
(
α + xC
2
)
. (9)
Claim A.3 in the web appendix shows that the mixed strategy equilibrium
described in 4.3 for the case σL < αδσH/(1 + δ) also holds when σL/σH ∈
(δα/(1 + δ), xC). The only difference stems from the fact that the profit of
the Incumbent in the one period game is greater than the equilibrium profit
in the two period game. As a consequence, we need to check that deviations
where the Incumbent would retain all the hsc customers are not profitable.
This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 4. The equilibrium described in section 4.3 is also an equilibrium
when σL/σH belongs to the interval (δα/(1 + δ), xC). The profit of the In-
cumbent in this equilibrium is smaller than its profit in the equilibrium of the
one period game.
Before commenting on this result, it is worth emphasizing that we have
shown that there exists one equilibrium of the dynamic game which yields
profits smaller than static profit, not that all equilibria of the dynamic game
satisfy this property.9
In the static model, all hsc consumers always purchase from the In-
cumbent at price σH ; the lsc consumers impose no externality on the hsc
consumers, since there is no future price to take into account. In the dynamic
game, entrants are more aggressive than in the static game and also more
attractive to the hsc consumers because they charge less than the Incumbent
in the second period (at least if not too many hsc consumers change suppli-
ers). When α is large enough, the entrants charge a sufficiently low price and
attract sufficiently many hsc consumers that the Incumbent would be better
off if it had only one period with less aggressive competitors to accumulate
its profits. We believe that this is the first time that this phenomenon has
been identified in the literature.
9We conjecture, but have been unable to prove, that all equilibria of the dynamic game
do satisfy the property.
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5 A continuum of types
In this section, we reexamine our model when there is an continuum of con-
sumers of mass 1 with switching costs distributed according to the distribu-
tion function F (σ) over10 [σ, σ]. We will say that F is spread out if σ = 0,
σ > 0, and F has no atom — this hypothesis ensures that the model is suffi-
ciently different from the one switching cost model and that the discounted
two period profit is not equal to the one period profit.11
In the one period case with a continuum of consumers, the free rider effect
manifests itself in the following way. The monopolist charges the price
pm = arg max
p
p(1− F (p)).
Consumers with σ ≥ pm incur a cost of pm rather than the cost σ that they
would incur if they were the only consumer. (Consumers with σ < pm incur
no cost because of the presence of the other consumers.) If F is spread out,
there will be some consumers who do not purchase from the Incumbent.
We can show the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the continuum case, with δ ∈ (0, 1) the profit of the In-
cumbent is greater than the one period profit and smaller than the discounted
value of a flow of one period profits, both with Stackelberg and Bertrand tim-
ing. When the distribution F is spread out, both inequalities are strict.
As is obvious from Proposition 1, the fact that F is spread out is not
necessary for the fact the profit of the Incumbent is strictly smaller than the
value of a flow of one period profit. For instance, Proposition 2 also holds
if there are many “small” atoms or if F (σ) = 0 for σ ∈ [0, ε] with ε small
enough.
For simplicity, in the formal development that follows, we focus on equi-
libria where in period 1, a) there are at least two low price entrants and b) all
consumers who do not purchase an incumbent purchase from the same firm.
This does not affect equilibrium profits or choices.
For both the Stackelberg and the Bertrand case, it is easy to prove that
there exists a σI such that in the first period all the consumers with switching
costs greater than σI purchase from the Incumbent and all the consumers
10The assumption that the lower bound of the distribution is 0 is not essential, but
simplifies the discussion by ruling out boundary effects.
11For example, if we have F (σ) = σ − 100 for σ ∈ [100, 101] and 0 otherwise, or
F (σ) = σ/100000 for σ ∈ [0, 100) and F (100) = 1, all the economics are essentially the
same as if the switching cost of every consumer is equal to 100.
18
with switching costs smaller than σI purchase from the entrant. It is straight-
forward to show than for any σI in the second period the Incumbent will
charge12
pI2(σI) ≥ max{pm, σI}.
5.1 Stackelberg competition
Under Stackelberg competition, after pI1 has been chosen, σI and the low-
est entrant price pE1 satisfy (we are simplifying the notation by not writing
explicitly their dependence on pI1)
Ù a zero profit condition for entry:
F (σI)p
E
1 + δ[F (σI)− F (pE2 (σI))]pE2 (σI) = 0; (10)
Ù a condition that states that the consumer with switching cost σI is
indifferent between purchasing from the entrant or from the Incumbent
(notice that if he purchases from the Incumbent, his second period cost
will necessarily be σI as the Incumbent will never charge less in the
second period and if it charges more the consumer can purchase from
a second period entrant at price 0):
pI1 + δσI = σI + p
E
1 + δp
E
2 (σI) =⇒ pI1− (1− δ)σI = pE1 + δpE2 (σI). (11)
Therefore, in the first period, the Incumbent chooses pI1 to solve
max
pI1,σI ,p
E
1
Π = [1− F (σI)] pI1 + δpI2(σI)
[
1− F (pI2(σI))
]
,
subject to (10) and (11).
(12)
Multiplying (11) by F (σI) and adding to (10), we obtain
pI1 = (1− δ)σI + δ
F (pE2 (σI))
F (σI)
pE2 (σI). (13)
Substituting (13) into (12), we obtain the profit as a function of σI :
Π = δ [1− F (σI)] F (p
E
2 (σI))
F (σI)
pE2 (σI)
+ (1− δ)[1− F (σI)]σI + δpI2(σI)[1− F (pI2(σI))]. (14)
This yields the following proof.
12In the second period, the effective competition for the Incumbent is coming from the
second period entrants, not from the first period entrant who is trying to extract profits
from the consumers it attracted in the first period.
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Proof of Proposition 2 with Stackelberg timing. The second and third terms
of (14) obviously reach their maxima for σI = p
m. Because the first term is
positive (and strictly positive whenever F does not have an atom at σI), the
maximum value of Π is (strictly) greater than
(1− δ)[1− F (σm)]σm + δσm[1− F (σm)] = σm,
which is the one period profit of the Incumbent.
To show that the profit is less than the value of a two period flow of one
period profits, notice that pE2 (σI) ≤ σI and therefore F (pE2 (σI)) ≤ F (σI),
with both inequalities strict if F is spread out. Therefore, the first term
of (14) is smaller that δ[1 − F (σI)]σI (and strictly smaller if F is spread
out). This implies that Π is less (or strictly less) than
[1− F (σI)]σI + δpI2(σI)[1− F (pI2(σI))],
whose maximum is (1 + δ)(1− F (σm)σm, which proves the result.
5.2 Bertrand competition
Now, we turn to Bertrand timing.
In the first period, the equilibrium conditions are the following:
Ù the Incumbent takes pE1 as given and chooses p
I
1 to maximize
Π = [1− F (σI)]pI1 + δpI2(σI)[1− F (pI2(σI))],
subject to (11).
Ù Given pI1, the price chosen by the lower price entrant p
E
1 and σI satisfy
conditions (10) and (11).
We can now finish the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2 with Bertrand timing. We first prove that the profit
of the Incumbent is greater than the one period profit. Using (11) to sub-
stitute in for pI1 and thinking of the Incumbent as choosing σI given p
E
1 , we
have
Π = (1− δ)[1− F (σI)]σI + δpI2(σI)[1− F (pI2(σI))]
+ [1− F (σI)]
(
pE1 + δp
E
2 (σI)
)
(15)
The profit of the entrant is
0 = pE1 × F (σI) + δpE2 (σI)
(
F (σI)− F (pE2 (σI))
) ≤ (pE1 + δpE2 (σI))F (σI)
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and therefore the last term of (15) is positive (strictly positive if F is spread
out). This implies that the profit of the Incumbent is greater (strictly when F
is spread out) than
max
σI
(1− δ)[1− F (σI)]σI + δpI2(σI)[1− F (pI2(σI))],
which is the one period profit.
We now prove that the profit of the Incumbent is smaller than a dis-
counted flow of one period profits. Competition between the first period
entrants imply pE1 ≤ 0, with a strict inequality when F has no atom. What-
ever the σI chosen by the Incumbent, p
E
2 (σI) ≤ σI (with a strict inequality
when F is spread out). Therefore, the last term of (15) is (strictly when F
is spread out) smaller than δ[1 − F (σI)]σI , which implies the result by the
same reasoning as in the Stackelberg case.
5.3 Example: the uniform distribution
Now, we illustrate the equilibrium in the continuum of type case with σ uni-
formly distributed on [0, 1]. This will allow us to show that the Incumbent’s
equilibrium profits can be different in the Stackelberg and the Bertrand case.
5.3.1 Stackelberg
With σ uniformly distributed on [0, 1], we have pE2 (σI) = σI/2 and therefore,
using (13), equation (14) becomes
Π = δ (1− σI) σI
4
+ (1− δ) (1− σI) σI + δ max{1
2
, σI}
[
1−max{1
2
, σI}
]
.
For any δ, this profit is maximized for σI = 1/2. The profit of the Incumbent,
is 1 + δ/4 times the static profit, 1/2.
Of course, pI2 = 1/2 and, by (13), we obtain p
I
1 = (1−3δ/4)×(1/2) so that
the total discounted cost for consumers with a switching cost greater than 1/2
is (1+δ/4)×(1/2). Interestingly, whereas in the static case, consumers never
lose from the presence of other consumers with different switching costs, in
the dynamic case consumers whose σ belong to the interval
[
1/2, (1+δ/4)/2
)
have higher total cost than if all the consumers had the same switching cost
than they have.
5.3.2 Bertrand
With σ uniform on [0, 1], (10) becomes
pE1 = −
δ
4
σI , (10’)
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whereas (11) becomes pI1 = (1− δ/2) σI + pE1 . Given the fact that there is a
one to one correspondence between pI1 and σI , it is possible, and turns out
to be more convenient to think of the Incumbent as choosing σI .
We can show13 σI ≥ 1/2 and therefore pI2 = σI and by (15) Π = [1 −
σI ]((1 + δ/2)σI + p
E
1 ). The first order condition of the Incumbent’s problem
yields σI = 1/2 − pE1 /(2(1 + δ/2)), which combined with (10’) yields the
equilibrium14 σI = (4 + 2δ)/(8 + 3δ) > 1/2. The equilibrium profit of the
Incumbent is (1 + δ/2)(1 + δ/4)2/(2 + 3/4δ)2.
This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If σI is distributed uniformly on [0, 1], at equilibrium in both
periods the Incumbent charges more and has fewer customers in the Bertrand
model than in the Stackelberg model. Its discounted profit is smaller in the
Bertrand model.
6 Literature
The main point of Biglaiser et al. (2013) is that the incumbent gains from
having the zero switching cost consumers in the market because they get
in the way of entrants trying to attract consumers with positive switching
costs.15 Since a firm will never make profits from the zero switching cost con-
sumers their presence will not affect a firm’s price that attracts zero switch-
ing cost consumers and the externality that we identify in the current paper
is not present. That is, the fact that entrants can make profits from low
switching cost consumers fundamentally changes the strategic opportunities
of consumers and firms.16
Besides our companion paper, Taylor (2003) has the closest model to
ours in the literature. The main aim of his paper is to analyze dynamic
competition between firms in a subscription model where consumers draw
13With σI < 1/2 by (15), the profit of the Incumbent would be (1 − σI)pI1 + δ/4 =
(1− σI)[(1− δ/2)σI + pE1 ] + δ/4, whose derivative with respect to σI is (1− δ/2) (−2σI +
1) − pE1 . Because −pE1 > 0, this derivative would be strictly positive, which establishes
the contradiction.
14In the preceding paragraphs, we have only checked that the first order conditions
holds. It is straightforward to check that this is indeed an equilibrium.
15We did not conduct the analysis where both types of consumers had positive switching
costs in the infinite horizon model because of the difficulties in defining and proving that
stationary equilibria exists in such a setting.
16The equilibrium construction is also different. Under Stackelberg competition, in
the companion paper the Incumbent loses no hsc consumers, whereas in this paper it
always loses a positive measure. Under Bertrand competition, in the companion paper the
Incumbent loses either all or no HSC consumers whereas in this paper it loses some or all.
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switching costs in each period from identical, independent distributions (in
subscription models, introduced in the literature by Chen (1997), firms can
discriminate between their current consumers and the consumers of other
firms). With enough firms (in most of his analysis Taylor assumes free entry)
competition drives the profits obtained from attracting consumers from other
firms to zero.
In section 5 of his paper, Taylor examines a two period model where
two types of consumers draw their switching cost (as before, independently
in each period) from different distributions. His focus is on describing the
equilibrium strategies of the firms and of the consumers. As in our models
some hsc consumers want to “hide” among lsc consumers. He interprets this
as an attempt by hsc consumers to acquire a reputation as lsc consumers.
In our model consumers are anonymous and there is no way to discriminate
between them; they have no way and no incentives to acquire a reputation.
Yet, we obtain the same result. The explanation is simple: hsc consumers
have incentives to mix with lsc consumers, as long as no too many of them
do so. Our second contribution is that in the two type model we focus
on the profit of the Incumbent and derive clean results comparing static
and dynamic models. In particular, we are able to show how increasing
the number of lsc consumers protects the Incumbent from the attempts by
entrants to steal away some of the hsc consumers.
To the best of our knowledge, Taylor’s section 5 and our companion pa-
per are the only models in the literature where consumers have persistent
differences between their switching costs.
For instance, Dube´, Hitsch, and Rossi (2009) have studied an infinite hori-
zon model where consumers have random utility and firms sell differentiated
products; their focus is on empirics, and, through the use of simulation meth-
ods, they provide numerical examples where prices fall when switching costs
increase: as in our model, the increase in switching costs makes firms more
aggressive as attracting consumers become more valuable. They assume that
all consumers have the same switching costs.
A number of authors have constructed model versions of the model of
Dube´ et al. (2009) designed for theoretical exploration. For instance, Cabral
(2013) analyzes an infinite horizon subscription model of competition be-
tween two producers. The relative value that the consumers attach to the
goods produced by the two consumers is independent from period to period.
He shows that an increase in switching cost from a small level leads to a
decrease in the price, for the same reasons as in Dube´ et al. (2009). All con-
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sumers have the same switching cost.17,18 Somaini and Einav (2013) develop
an overlapping generation model where consumes have identical switching
costs that share some features of Cabral.19
It may also be worthwhile noting that most of the literature assumes
a fixed number of firms, whereas our results hold true with free entry, and
therefore more intense competition.20 Hence, the Incumbent has no incentive
to invest in the acquisition of new customers, on which it can only make zero
profits — indeed, in equilibrium, the Incumbent does not try to “recover”
the consumers that it has lost to other firms. Our comparative statics are
entirely the consequence of the heterogeneity of switching costs, and of the
fact that low switching cost customers protect the Incumbent from entry.
7 Conclusion
In this conclusion we provide some remarks about our modelling choices and
about possible extensions.
Due to free entry, all our results hold if firms are allowed to discriminate
on the basis of the past purchasing history of consumers — that is if we
transformed our model in a subscription model. Indeed, an incumbent will
compete for new consumers with entrants, and will therefore not be able to
generate any profits on that market.
In our previous paper, Biglaiser et al. (2013) we studied a model similar
to the model of this paper, with an infinite horizon, while assuming σL = 0.
In that case, consumers allocate themselves in different firms (a firm will
choose a “high” price as soon as its clientele contains one hsc consumer).
Studying the case where σL is strictly positive generates a free rider effect as
hsc consumers try to “follow” lsc consumers. Section 5 also showed that
this effect holds with a continuum of types.
Network effects have sometimes been compared to social switching costs
because they make it more difficult for groups of consumers to switch from
17Arie and Grieco (2013) also provide a theoretical analysis of Dube´ et al. (2009), again
which consumers who all have the same switching costs. Unlike Cabral (and like Dube´
et al.), they assume that the consumers are myopic. Our consumers are forward looking.
18In a subscription model with forward looking consumers based on Chen (1997), Bouck-
aert, Degryse, and Provoost (2008) also show that higher switching costs can lead to lower
profits. In their model, consumers are ex-ante identical and learn of their switching costs
only after making their first purchase.
19Arie and Grieco (2013) also provide a theoretical analysis of Dube´ et al. (2009) but,
unlike Cabral (and like Dube´ et al.), they assume that the consumers are myopic. (Our
consumers are forward looking.)
20As mentioned above, Taylor (2003) also analyses free entry.
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one platform to another. In order to test this parallelism Biglaiser and
Cre´mer (2015) study dynamic competition in a model with an incumbent
and free entry and with heterogenous network effects. They show that there
are similarities but also substantial differences21 between the two setups (see
Cre´mer and Biglaiser (2012) for a preliminary discussion of some of these
results and comparisons between the two setups).
21From a modelling viewpoint, the main difference is probably that with network effects
the migration from one platform to the other is the outcome of a coordination game
between consumers. In order to develop the model one needs to take a stance on the
coordination failures that might arise. See Biglaiser, Cre´mer, and Veiga (2015) for a more
detailed study of these failures.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5
In this Appendix, we prove Lemma 5. We begin by establishing three
claims; the first one is part iv of the lemma.
Claim A.1. If pI > (1−αδ)σH , the Incumbent has zero sales in both periods.
Proof. If pI > (1 − αδ)σH , a unique lowest price entrant who would charge
pE ∈ (−αδσH , pI − σH) would make strictly positive profits equal to pE +
δασH , as it would attract all the consumers in period 1. Free entry prevents
this, and therefore in the continuation game, one or several entrants must
charge −αδσH , and attract all the consumers while making zero profits.
Claim A.2. If pI < (1− αδ)σH , no entrant attracts enough hsc consumers
in period 1 that it finds it optimal to charge σH with probability 1 in period 2.
Proof. Assume that entrant e˜ attracted a large enough proportion of hsc
customers that it found it optimal to charge σH in period 2. Because lsc
consumers always find it strictly more profitable to switch suppliers than do
hsc consumers, the Incumbent would have no lsc customers and, therefore,
hsc customers can guarantee themselves a second price of σH by “staying
with” the Incumbent. Therefore, entrant e˜ must have chosen a period 1
price pe˜ ≤ pI − σH < −δασH < −δσL (the last inequality is a consequence
of equation (2)). By lemma 2, all the entrants that attract consumers in
the first period also charge pe˜. They attract all the lsc consumers and, at
best, some hsc consumers. The sum of their profits is therefore smaller than
max{pe˜ + δσL, pe˜ + δασH} < 0, which establishes the contradiction.
Claim A.3. If pI < (1−δ)σH , all hsc consumers purchase from the Incum-
bent in period 1.
Proof. By Claim A.2, any period 1 entrant who has attracted consumers
in period 1 charges σL with positive probability in period 2. Therefore, its
second period profit will be σL times the mass of consumers it attracted in the
first period and, by free entry, its period 1 price must be −δσL. The total
discounted cost for a hsc consumer who would purchase from a period 1
entrant would therefore be at least (−δσL + σH) + δσL = σH (it would
be greater if in period 2 the entrant charged σH with a strictly positive
probability). If the consumer purchases from the Incumbent, his total cost
is pI + δσH < σH , which establishes the claim.
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Parts i and ii of the lemma follow immediately from Claim A.3.
If pI ∈
(
(1 − δ)σH , (1 − αδ)σH
)
, hsc consumers prefer to purchase from
an entrant if its period 2 price is σL and from the Incumbent if the entrant’s
period 2 price is σH . Therefore, there can be an equilibrium only if the
entrants play a mixed strategy in period 2, which is feasible only if in period 1
they attract a proportion γ > 0 of the hsc consumers. This establishes
part iii of the lemma and completes the proof.
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Web Appendix
In this Appendix, which is not intended for publication, we prove the
results discussed in subsection 4.5. Note that we are less ambitious than
when (1) holds: we are only trying to identify one equilibrium for each value
of σL/σH , not to characterize all the equilibria. We present the results under
the form of three claims, starting with the largest value of σL/σH .
Claim WA.1. If σL/σH > α, then the two period Bertrand game has a
unique equilibrium in which the Incumbent charges σL(1 − δ) in period 1
and σL in period 2. It sells to all consumers and its profits are σL.
As in the one period model, when σL > ασH the Incumbent and the
entrant act as if there were only lsc customers in the economy. We leave
the proof of the claim to the reader.
For σL/σH ∈ (xC , α), with xC defined by (9), we establish the following
claim:
Claim WA.2. If σL/σH ∈ [xC , α], there exists a pure strategy equilibrium
in which the Incumbent, whose profits are ασH , sells to the hsc consumers
in both periods, at prices respectively equal to σH(1 − δ) and σH . All lsc
customers purchase from entrants at price −δσL in period 1 and at price σL
in period 2.
Proof. We show that the strategies described in the claim form an equilib-
rium. The lsc customers are clearly better off switching in period 1. The
strategy of the hsc customers is a best response to the strategy of the other
agents as they are indifferent between purchasing from the Incumbent in both
periods and switching to an entrant in the first period — in both cases their
total discounted costs are equal to σH .
This indifference of hsc consumers implies that the Incumbent would
loose at least a proportion γ of its customers if it increased its period 1
price. It is straightforward to see that, under these circumstances, its most
profitable increase in price is to σH − σL. This deviation is unprofitable as
long as
ασH ≥ (1− γ)(σH − δσL + δσH)
⇐⇒ σL
σH
[1 + δ + αδ − α] ≥ δ [α + (σL/σH)2] ,
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and therefore, as long as σL/σH ∈ [xC , α]. A small decrease in period 1 price
obviously decreases the profits of the Incumbent. A decrease to σL(1 − δ)
allows it to sell to all consumers in period 1, but decreases its profits. Finally,
it is easy to show that the entrants strategy is indeed a best response to the
strategies of the other agents.
For the remaining set of parameters, we can prove the following claim.
Claim WA.3. The equilibrium described in 4.3 is also an equilibrium when
σL/σH ∈ [αδ/(1 + δ), xC ].
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as when σL/σH ≤ αδ/(1 + δ), except
that we need to be a bit more careful when showing that the Incumbent does
not gain by deviating to pI in (σL(1− δ), σH(1− δ)) and possibly selling to
all the hsc consumers. The Incumbent sells to all the hsc customers if
pI + δσH ≤ pE + σH + δσL ⇐⇒ pI ≤ pE + (1− δ)σH + δσL.
This implies that if pI ∈ [(1− αδ − δ)σH + δσL, (1− δ)σH ], the Incumbent
sells to all the hsc consumers with probability strictly between 1−γ and 1 —
in the other states of nature, it sells to a proportion 1−γ of them. Using the
mixing probability of the entrant, see equation (8), the Incumbent’s profit
for prices in [(1 − αδ − δ)σH + δσL, (1− δ)σH ] is
(pI + δσH)α [GE(pE) + (1−GE(pE))(1− γ)]
= (pI + δσH)α
[
GE(pI − (1− δ)σH − δσL))
+ (1−GE(pI − (1− δ)σH − δσL))(1− γ)
]
=
(pI + δσH)α
pI + 2δσH − δσL
×
[
pI − σH(1− δ − αδ)− δσL + (1− γ)σH(1 + δ − αδ)
]
.
The first and the second terms are both increasing in pI . So, the maximal
profit from this deviation is at a price of pI = σH(1 − δ). At this price
the Incumbent only keeps all the hsc customers when the entrant is pricing
at −δσL, where there is an atom in the distribution of its prices. It is
straightforward to see that the profit is less than the putative equilibrium
profit. Finally, it is straightforward to show that a deviation that keeps the
lsc customers cannot improve profits.
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